The  Substantial Relation  Question in Gender Discrimination Cases by Engles, William R.
The "Substantial Relation" Question in
Gender Discrimination Cases
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' to require that
statutes containing gender-based classifications satisfy an interme-
diate level of judicial review.2 Unlike "strict scrutiny," which al-
most always results in the invalidation of the challenged statute,3
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."). The same constraints placed upon the states by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are placed upon the federal gov-
ernment by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
' Until the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court followed a "two-tier" approach in its equal
protection jurisprudence, analyzing classifications under either the "rational basis" test or
the "strict scrutiny" test. Compare Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-
10 (1949) (rational basis), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (strict scrutiny).
Gender classifications were originally subjected only to the rational basis test, LAURENCE
TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-24, at 1060 (1978), and consequently were usu-
ally upheld, see, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948) (upholding statute
prohibiting a woman not the wife or daughter of a tavern owner from becoming a bar-
tender), disapproved in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976). In the early 1970's,
however, it became clear that while the Court purported to apply a rational basis standard
in gender cases, it actually began to employ a more rigorous level of scrutiny. See Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (invalidating state statute preferring males over females in
the administration of estates); see also L. TRmE, supra, § 16-25, at 1063; Gunther, In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 34 (1972); infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing Reed). In
fact, a plurality of four justices in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating
federal statute automatically providing benefits to married servicemen, but requiring ser-
vicewomen to demonstrate the dependence of their husbands), argued that gender classifica-
tions should be considered "suspect" and thus subject to strict scrutiny, id. at 688. See infra
notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing Frontiero). In 1976 the Court settled on an
"intermediate" level of scrutiny-often called "heightened" scrutiny-for gender discrimi-
nation cases. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting
the sale of 3.2% beer to men, but not women, aged 18-21); infra notes 53-62 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Craig).
I See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (invalidating statute prohibiting
miscegenation); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (invalidating statute re-
quiring sterilization of certain criminals); see also Gunther, supra note 2, at 8 (strict scru-
tiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (upholding exclusion of Japanese-Americans from certain areas during World
War II); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-02 (1943) (upholding curfew for
Japanese-Americans). The Court applies strict scrutiny to legislation that classifies on the
basis of race, see, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (prohibition of miscegenation), national origin,
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and "rationality review," under which statutes are upheld rou-
tinely,4 intermediate-level scrutiny involves potentially very diffi-
cult line-drawing exercises. To overcome a challenge under the
equal protection clause, a gender-based classification "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives." 5 Unfortunately, the re-
quirement that a classification be "substantially related" to an
"important" governmental objective is "hardly a precise stan-
dard."6 Indeed, because of the vagueness of the intermediate-level
test, its meaning can be understood only by examining the Su-
preme Court's actual decisions.7
The Court has not found especially troublesome the require-
ment that the legislative objective be "important,"8 but its deci-
see, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (restrictions on movement of Japanese-Americans), or
that infringes a "fundamental interest," see, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (sterilization of
criminals).
4 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding
federal statute effectively providing, in some situations, more retirement benefits to those
who had worked first for a non-railroad employer and then a railroad employer than to
those who had worked first for a railroad employer and then a non-railroad employer); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-94 (1979) (upholding rule excluding
methadone-program participants from employment as bus drivers). But see, e.g., United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) ("mere rationality" review used
to strike down federal statute denying food stamps to households containing unrelated per-
sons). The Court applies rationality review to all classifications that neither involve a sus-
pect class nor are based on alienage, illegitimacy, or gender. To these last three types of
classifications, the Court applies intermediate-level scrutiny. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (alienage); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977) (illegiti-
macy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir. 1977) (Coffin, C.J.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 950 (1978).
7 Commentators have found the intermediate-level formula vague, and one concluded
that "the middle tier has no predictable application. Whether or not a given classification
furthers an 'important governmental interest,' or is 'substantially related' to this interest,
are subjective determinations, and a conservative majority is as likely to conclude one way
as a liberal majority is to conclude the other." Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal
Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639,
671 (1979); see also Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposal
for Equal Protection, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1501, 1554 (1983) (Craig v. Boren test "is inadequate
to support consistent decisionmaking absent precise definitions of its embodying elements");
Note, Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier". The Impact on Women and Illegitimates,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303, 321 (1978) (noting the "confusion and inconsistency generated"
by the Court's middle-tier cases).
8 The Court has typically found the legislative objective "important." See, e.g., Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (well-being of illegitimate children); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 280 (1979) (provision for needy spouses and compensation for past discrimina-
tion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) (enhancement of traffic safety). But see,
e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-30 (1982) (state failed to
establish "important" purpose in limiting enrollment in nursing school to women); Orr, 440
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sions reveal an interesting problem in determining whether a gen-
der-based classification is "substantially related" to its objective.
As the intermediate-level test has evolved, two different views of
the "substantial relation" requirement have appeared in the deci-
sions. Both views start with what might be called "conventional"
equal protection analysis.' This approach requires the state to
show a substantial difference between men and women that is rele-
vant to the classification-that is, that the reason for burdening
members of one sex does not apply with the same force to mem-
bers of the other sex. The first view stops here. The second view,
however, goes beyond this traditional inquiry and requires that, in
addition to pointing out relevant differences between men and
women, the government also advance a sufficiently good reason for
not treating the sexes identically.
This comment examines the second approach as it has devel-
oped in the Supreme Court's opinions. Part I discusses intermedi-
ate scrutiny and explains the two possible approaches. Part II ex-
amines the Supreme Court decisions that anticipate, enunciate,
and refine the intermediate-level tests. While the traditional ap-
proach, which looks only at relevant differences, has been most
prominent in the Court's opinions, the possibility that the govern-
ment must also show that there is a good reason for differential
treatment has recently been discussed openly by the Court, but the
Court has yet to decide unambiguously which test is appropriate.
Part III analyzes the evolution of the Court's treatment of the
"substantial relation" question and considers the implications of
the additional requirement that there be a good reason for gender-
specific treatment. This requirement certainly would tighten the
traditional "relevant differences" requirement; it might also be
founded upon a different concept of equality than that embodied
in the traditional approach.
U.S. at 279 (preference for family unit in which wife is dependent not an allowable purpose).
The Court has generally stated that administrative efficiency is not a sufficiently important
objective to sustain a gender classification, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976);
infra notes 38, 50 and accompanying text, but it has also indicated that administrative sav-
ings might be significant enough to support a gender classification, see Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 81 (1981)
(accepting administrative-convenience justification in military context).
' See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
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I. GENERAL FRAMEWORK: APPROACHES TO INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL
SCRUTINY
Legislation inevitably classifies,' 0 and most such classifications
are presumed valid in the face of a challenge under the equal pro-
tection clause." Legislators are generally prohibited only from act-
ing arbitrarily, and the classifications they create normally need
only meet a standard of "minimum rationality": 2 the objective of
the statute must be "legitimate,"'" and the classification must be
"rationally related" to the achievement of that objective. 4 The
test thus requires a certain "fit" between the classification at issue
and the goal that the legislature seeks to achieve through that clas-
sification.'5 That is, there must be some justification for burden-
ingI6 one group that does not apply with the same force to the
other group.17 For example, a state might require its police officers
10 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per
curiam) ("the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an
unavoidable one"); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 59 (1976) ("Classification is an inescapable part of government. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a State to allow an almost blind man to drive an automobile
because it grants licenses to those with perfect vision.").
"' See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("every duly enacted state and
federal law is entitled" to a "presumption of constitutionality") (citing Lockport v. Citizens
for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 272 (1977)).
'2 See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("legislative classifications are
valid unless they bear no rational relationship to a permissible state objective") (citations
omitted); supra note 4.
'3 See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 & n.39 (1979).
U4 See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 & n.39 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976) (per curiam).
15 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (courts must determine
"whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose"); Tuss-
man & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949) ("A
reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law."); cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-48
(1980) (discussing fit in the context of suspicious classifications).
1 Of course, a statute might benefit, instead of burden, a particular group. Indeed,
every classification might be seen as "benefiting" one group and "burdening" another, de-
pending on how those terms are defined. For ease of discussion, this comment will refer only
to statutory burdens.
17 This approach to the requirement of a certain "relation" between the classification
and its objective can be divided into two parts. First, is the state's objective actually fur-
thered by the statute? Second, is there a sufficient difference, related to the state's objec-
tive, between the groups that are treated differently by the statute? Consider, for example, a
state prohibition on the provision of water to residents of X County that is defended on the
ground that drunk driving will be reduced since the residents of X County will be unable to
mix alcoholic drinks containing water. This classification would probably fail the first part
of the "relation" test, even under "rationality" review, because the residents of X County
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to retire at age fifty on the ground that those over fifty are not
usually healthy enough to perform their duties effectively. Since
the quality (unacceptable physical fitness) that motivates the legis-
lation is more prevalent in older police officers than in younger
ones, the law's classification exhibits a sufficiently good fit to meet
the standard of minimum rationality. 8
In certain circumstances, however, the presumption of validity
is abandoned, and a legislative classification is subjected to a more
exacting level of scrutiny.'9 One way to apply a higher level of
scrutiny is simply to tighten the requirements of the conventional
approach employed in the "rationality" cases. The intermediate-
level formula used in gender cases suggests just such a technique:
the government interest must be "important," instead of merely
"legitimate," and the classification must be "substantially," rather
can still consume alcoholic drinks not mixed with water, and drunk driving will not be re-
duced. The classification would fail the second part of the test if it were shown that resi-
dents of X County are no more likely than residents of other counties to mix water-based
alcoholic drinks and then drive: in that case the justification for the statutory burden would
apply with no more force to residents of X County than to residents of other counties.
18 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)
(upholding such a statute). Note, however, that because the classifying trait (in this case,
being fifty years old) is typically only a proxy for the quality that is in fact important to the
legislature's goal (here, poor physical fitness), a classification may be both underinclusive
(some of those under fifty are in poor health) and overinclusive (some of those over fifty are
in good health). That is, the "fit' between the classification and its objective may be imper-
fect. For a discussion of under- and over-inclusiveness, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note
15. The question under the equal protection clause then becomes how tight a "fit" is re-
quired in order for the classification to survive a constitutional challenge. Where the re-
quirement is only that the classification be "rationally" related to the objective, almost any
"fit" at all will suffice. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
178 (1980) (classification not "patently arbitrary"); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316 (criterion not
"wholly unrelated" to the statute's objective).
19 For example, courts tend to examine closely any classification where they suspect
that it is the product, not of reasoned legislative decisionmaking, but of an illicit motive,
such as prejudice. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (some classifications
"suspect" because "more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than leg-
islative rationality"); see also Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 140 ("It is now a commonplace that the purpose
of heightened scrutiny is to filter out illegitimate motives in cases in which such motives are
especially likely to be at work.") [hereinafter cited as Sunstein, Public Values]. This con-
cern might be triggered where, for instance, there is a history of hostility toward a particular
group, or the trait identifying the group is immutable, or the group is politically powerless.
See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (certain groups historically have suffered prejudice,
have been relegated to a position of political powerlessness, and have been disadvantaged by
virtue of circumstances beyond their control); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Consti-
tution, 84 COLUm. L. REv. 1689, 1711, 1715 (1984) (political powerlessness the key factor)
[hereinafter cited as Sunstein, Naked Preferences]. See generally, J. ELY, supra note 15, at
148-70.
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than merely "rationally," related to the objective.2 0 As before, the
"relation" question would be analyzed by asking if there is a rea-
son, related to the purpose of the legislation, to burden one group
that does not apply to the other group, but now a more significant
difference would be required.2 This traditional method of equal
protection analysis, when applied in the gender area, will be re-
ferred to as the "similarly-situated" test.22
The Court's decisions,23 however, raise the possibility of an ad-
ditional requirement: beyond pointing to some difference between
men and women that provides a reason for treating men and
women differently, the state must demonstrate that there is a good
reason for not treating men and women identically.24 In other
words, the state must show that the gender-specific statute pro-
motes some worthwhile goal that would not be promoted by a gen-
der-neutral statute. This requirement will be referred to as the
"gender-neutral" test.
To illustrate the differences between the similarly-situated
and gender-neutral requirements, assume that a state's statutory
rape law prohibits "sexual intercourse involving any woman under
the age of seventeen, unless such intercourse is with the woman's
husband. '25 Under this statute, an unmarried woman under the
age of seventeen cannot have sex with any male, regardless of his
age, while a man under the age of seventeen may engage in sex
with women over the age of seventeen. Suppose further that a six-
teen-year-old woman is prosecuted, along with her twenty-one-
year-old male companion, for violating the statute. She then chal-
20 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
21 The key question, of course, is how much tighter the "relation" requirement should
be. One knows for sure only that, because "intermediate" review is involved, the fit should
be tighter than mere rationality review, but not as tight as strict scrutiny.
22 The phrase "similarly situated," because of its extensive use in the "rationality"
cases, see, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), might be taken
as a term of art indicating "mere rationality" review. As used in this comment, however, the
"similarly-situated test" denotes a method of analyzing the relation requirement; it does not
imply how strictly the method is applied.
23 See infra notes 30-122 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions).
2, Where a statute burdens only one sex, the other will always have a "mere" interest in
not being subject to that burden, and a state could always advance this as its "good" reason
for not extending the law to cover both sexes. Consequently, if the gender-neutral test is to
have any meaning, it must require that the interest in not being burdened meet some level
of significance. For example, the standard might be that the burden avoided be "impor-
tnt," as the first part of the Craig v. Boren test requires. See 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976);
supra text accompanying note 5.
25 Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (upholding statutory rape
law under which only the male was criminally liable) (discussed infra notes 85-106 and ac-
companying text).
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lenges the statute, claiming that its unequal treatment of men and
women violates her equal protection rights. The state responds
that it has an important interest in preventing teenage pregnancies
because they usually result in harm to the woman, to her child,
and (because illegitimate children often become wards of the state)
to society.26 The state also argues that the gender-specific classifi-
cation employed in the statute bears a "substantial relationship"
to this important interest because only women can become preg-
nant, so the state need only prohibit sex in those cases where a
teenage woman is involved-that is, those instances that can result
in a teenage pregnancy.2 7
Assuming that preventing teenage pregnancies is an important
state interest under intermediate-level scrutiny,2 the constitution-
ality of this statute turns on the "substantial relationship" require-
ment. In this hypothetical, the inquiry under the similarly-situated
test is whether there are differences between men and women, re-
lated to preventing teenage pregnancies, that justify burdening
women under seventeen, regardless of the age of their partner, that
do not apply to men under seventeen who are having sex with
older women.2 9 In this case, the state has strong reasons for
prohibiting all sex involving unmarried females under the age of
seventeen since significant harms result when young women be-
come pregnant. But because males cannot become pregnant, no il-
legitimate teenage pregnancy can result when teenage males and
adult women engage in sex. Since prohibiting male teenagers from
having sex with adult women would not further the statute's pur-
pose of preventing teenage pregnancies, the reason for the statu-
tory prohibition does not apply at all to that situation. Conse-
quently, because the "fit" between the classification and the
objective is very nearly perfect, the state has justified its statute
under the similarly-situated test.
Showing that the sexes are not similarly situated with respect
to the state's goal of preventing teenage pregnancies, however, does
"6 Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1981).
"' Cf. id. at 471-73.
28 See id. at 470-71.
, In order to answer this question, it is useful to imagine the legislature making two
independent decisions. First, what benefits are there to regulating the sexual habits of
women under the age of seventeen? All relevant factors, such as the harm caused by teenage
pregnancies and the costs of preventing these pregnancies, should be taken into account
when considering this hypothetical decision. A second, but independent, evaluation, based
again on all relevant factors, is made based on the benefits from prohibiting men under
seventeen from having sex with adult women. The statute passes the similarly-situated test
if these two decisions produce sufficiently different results (however that may be defined).
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not necessarily satisfy the gender-neutral test. The gender-neutral
test further requires the state to show a good reason for not treat-
ing men and women identically despite the fact that only women
can become pregnant. The state must show that its gender-specific
statute protects or advances an interest that would not have been
advanced by a gender-neutral one. Here, the state might claim that
protection of young men's interest in sexual freedom provides the
good reason for gender-specific treatment. But the interest of
young men in not being burdened in this case may not provide a
good reason for differential treatment. If this is the case, and if the
state in this illustration cannot demonstrate some other reason for
not burdening men under seventeen, then the gender-neutral test
will invalidate this classification although the statute survived in-
termediate scrutiny under the similarly-situated test.
As this hypothetical illustrates, the gender-neutral test is not
merely an alternative to the similarly-situated test; rather, it is
best regarded as a requirement imposed in addition to the simi-
larly-situated test. This conclusion follows from the nature of the
gender-neutral test, under which the government is required to
provide a "good reason" for not burdening one sex. If the sexes are
similarly situated, then by definition the state cannot provide such
a reason. Thus, because no statute can meet the gender-neutral re-
quirement without also passing the similarly-situated test, the gen-
der-neutral test encompasses the similarly-situated test. Further-
more, since the gender-neutral test can result in the invalidation of
statutes that do pass the similarly-situated test, the gender-neutral
requirement properly is regarded as imposed in addition to the
similarly-situated test.
II. THE CouRT's DECISIONS
In order to understand the content of the substantial-relation
requirement, one must see how the Court has applied the test in
actual cases. These cases reveal that both the similarly-situated
and the gender-neutral tests have appeared in the opinions, and
that the Court has only recently begun to address the distinctions
between the two approaches.
A. The Early Decisions
1. Reed. The first indication that gender classifications would
receive a heightened level of scrutiny came in 1971 with Reed v.
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Reed.3 0 Reed involved two sections of an Idaho statute providing
for the appointment of administrators of intestate's estates. The
first section divided those entitled to administer such an estate
into several classes, ranked the classes in order of preference, and
provided that the administrator was to be picked from the highest
class possible.3 1 Another section of the statute provided that males
were to be preferred to females if both were members of the same
class. 2 The respondents argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court had
held, that the preference statute served the purpose of avoiding
costly inquiries to determine which individual was more qualified
to serve as an administrator, thus reducing the workload of the
Idaho probate courts.3
The United States Supreme Court, ostensibly applying ration-
ality review,3 4 struck down the classification:
The objective of [the Idaho priority statute] clearly is to es-
tablish degrees of entitlement of various classes of persons in
accordance with the varying degrees and kinds of relationship
to the intestate. Regardless of their sex, persons within any
one of the enumerated classes of [the priority statute] are
similarly situated with respect to that objective. By providing
dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus simi-
larly situated, the challenged [preference] section violates the
Equal Protection Clause.3
The Court's conclusion that the classification was not even "ra-
tional," because no relevant characteristic was possessed more
often by men than by women, seems disingenuous. Since compe-
tence is a relevant factor in choosing an administrator, and since a
legislature could reasonably have concluded, as was argued before
the Court,36 that men generally have more business experience and
are therefore likely to be more competent in this regard than
30 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
31 See id. at 72-73.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 76; Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638-39 (1970); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (citing Brief for Appellee, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971)).
34 To survive equal protection clause scrutiny, the Court stated, "[a] classification 'must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike."' Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
35 Reed, 404 U.S. at 77 (citation omitted).
36 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (citing Brief for Appellee, Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
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women, this classification should have survived rationality re-
view.3 7 Thus, the Court in Reed purported to employ traditional
equal protection analysis-rationality review using the similarly-
situated test-but seemed to require a stronger showing than usual
under rationality review.
The Court also stated in Reed that although the government's
objective of reducing the workload of probate courts "is not with-
out some legitimacy," using the gender classification "merely to ac-
complish the elimination of hearings on the merits" was impermis-
sible s.3  This language may show that the Court accepted the
government's objective, but decided that the administrative sav-
ings was not a sufficiently good reason to treat the sexes differ-
ently. Under this interpretation, the Court's language is consistent
with the gender-neutral test.39
2. Frontiero. Two years after Reed, the Court decided Fron-
tiero v. Richardson,4 ° which involved a challenge to two federal
statutes that required servicewomen to prove the dependence of
their husbands in order to receive an increased allowance for living
quarters and medical benefits for the husband; any serviceman,
however, could simply claim his wife as a dependent and automati-
cally receive such benefits, regardless of whether the wife was actu-
ally dependent on him.41 The apparent justification42 for this dif-
" See Gunther, supra note 2, at 34 ("Even if the requirement be that the means bear a
'significant relationship' to the state's purpose, or contribute substantially to its achieve-
ment, the test would seem to have been met in Reed. Only by importing some special suspi-
cion of sex-related means . . . can the result be made entirely persuasive.") (footnotes
omitted).
" Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
" The suggestion that language in Reed supports the gender-neutral test should be
taken with caution. First, since the Court held that the statute did not pass the similarly-
situated test, the result in Reed did not depend upon the existence of any additional re-
quirements. Second, the Court gave no express indication that it was thinking in terms of
the gender-neutral test, and one should be careful about shoehorning the Court's reasoning
into a mode of analysis that it was not purporting to apply. Finally, the opinion might indi-
cate only that the Court found administrative convenience in this case to be a "legitimate,"
but not an "important," government interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (indi-
cating that the state objective in Reed, viz., reducing the workload on courts, failed the
"importance" test). If this is the case, then the Court did not even need to reach the ques-
tion of the relationship between the statute's classification and the government interest
under the intermediate-level test announced later in Craig. But see Reed, 404 U.S. at 77
(stating that the classification did not "advance[" the government's interest in a manner
consistent with the equal protection clause) (emphasis added).
0 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
41 Id. at 678.
42 The legislative history of the statute did not specify the reasons for the classification,
but the Court accepted the District Court's conclusion that the gender distinction was
drawn for purposes of administrative convenience. See id. at 681; Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F.
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ferential treatment was that, because wives usually depend upon
their spouses while husbands rarely do, and because approximately
ninety-nine percent of all members of the military are male, 43 such
differential treatment would lead to a "'considerable saving of ad-
ministrative expense and manpower.'-44 The Court nevertheless
struck down the statute; a plurality of four Justices applied strict
scrutiny on the ground that gender is a suspect class. 45
The plurality noted that the statute provided differential
treatment of men and women in two respects, First, a female
whose spouse was dependent on her had to prove that dependence
in order to receive benefits, while a male did not; second, the stat-
ute denied benefits to a servicewoman who did not support her
husband while granting benefits to a serviceman who did not sup-
port his wife.48 The plurality concluded that the statute thus
"command[ed] 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are
... similarly situated.' ,,47 This language and analysis, taken di-
rectly from Reed,48 is a straightforward application of the simi-
larly-situated test.
After finding that men and women were similarly situated for
the purposes of the statute, the plurality addressed the govern-
ment's argument that the classification was administratively effi-
cient. The plurality rejected this argument, noting that, the savings
were uncertain 49 and citing Reed for the proposition that it is im-
permissible to draw the gender line solely to achieve administra-
tive convenience. ° The plurality may have meant only that admin-
istrative efficiency by itself is not a sufficiently important
government objective.5 1 But its analysis, like that of the Court in
Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
43 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681.
" Id. at 682 (quoting Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd
sub nom. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
45 Id. at 688. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan and joined by Jus-
tices Douglas, White, and Marshall.
46 Id.
47 Id. (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 77).
48 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689-90. If administrative savings is considered to be one of the
objectives of the statute, the plurality's response can be considered an application of the
similarly-situated test. See supra note 17.
60 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 77, 76).
5! Cf. supra note 39 (discussing same possible interpretation of Reed). Indeed, the plu-
rality in Frontiero purported to apply strict scrutiny, and it may be that administrative
savings could never meet the stringent standards of that test. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (strict scrutiny requires that classification be justified by a "legitimate
overriding purpose"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (an "overriding statu-
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Reed, could also be interpreted to mean that, even when the gov-
ernment has shown that there is a significant difference between
men and women that is related to an important government objec-
tive (providing for dependent servicemen and servicewomen), ad-
ministrative savings does not provide a sufficiently good reason for
not treating men and women identically.52
Both Reed and the Frontiero plurality opinion show the Court
groping for a coherent alternative to the rigid two-tiered approach
under traditional equal protection analysis. Reed purported to ap-
ply minimum-rationality analysis and the Frontiero plurality pur-
ported to apply strict scrutiny, but both opinions in fact rest on
notions that later appear under the rubric of intermediate-level
scrutiny.
B. The Explicit Adoption of Intermediate-Level Scrutiny
1. Craig. In 1976, in Craig v. Boren,53 the Court adopted the
now familiar intermediate-level test for gender classifications. 4 In
Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
the sale of 3.2% beer to men aged eighteen to twenty-one, but did
not prohibit the sale of such beer to women in that age group.55
Arguing that the classification enhanced traffic safety, the state in-
troduced various statistical surveys establishing, inter alia, that
about 2% of men aged eighteen to twenty-one, but only .18% of
women in the same age group, were arrested for drunk driving. 6
The Court agreed with the state's contention that the
Oklahoma statute sought to enhance an important governmental
tory purpose" must justify a racial classification). If not, then the most natural interpreta-
tion of Frontiero's discussion of administrative convenience is that this government interest
was not sufficiently important. But the fact that the plurality examined the classification to
see if it actually achieved any administrative savings, see 411 U.S. at 689-90, indicates that
the plurality was not applying strict scrutiny in its traditional sense. Furthermore, the plu-
rality nowhere states that the classification must be "necessary," see, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S.
at 11, to a "compelling," see, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), or "overriding," see, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11, interest.
Consequently, the plurality may not have intended to apply strict scrutiny as it is usually
understood, but only a form of "heightened" scrutiny like that later adopted in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
82 The same considerations that caution against labeling Reed a "gender-neutral case,"
see supra note 39, apply here as well.
53 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14 Id. at 197 ("To withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."); see also supra note 2.
55 Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92.
56 Id. at 200-01.
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interest, the protection of public health and safety.5 It concluded,
however, that the statute was not substantially related to this valid
objective because, while a disparity of 2 % versus .18% "is not triv-
ial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employ-
ment of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly if maleness
is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2%
must be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit.' ",,
In its analysis, the Court did not make entirely clear whether
it saw the relevant comparison as 2% versus .18% or as 98% ver-
sus 99.82%. The Court's treatment of the statistical evidence sug-
gests that it was concerned with the latter comparison, which
shows that the overwhelming majority of both men (98%) and
women (99.82%) are similar in that they pose no drinking-and-
driving threat. If this is the relevant comparison, Craig can be ex-
plained by the similarly-situated test alone.
A lawmaker, however, might naturally compare 2% with .18%
and conclude that the drinking-and-driving problem is serious
enough among males aged eighteen to twenty-one to warrant a ban
on the sale of beer to them, but that so few women in that age
group drink and drive that they should not be similarly bur-
dened.59 If this comparison is the relevant one, then the Court's
result is not clearly explained by the similarly-situated test. A dif-
ference measured by a factor of more than ten would probably be
substantial enough to pass the intermediate-level test.
Since Oklahoma offered no state interest that was enhanced
by excluding women from the statute's coverage, the result in
Craig might be explained by the gender-neutral test. The exclusion
of women from the prohibition at issue in Craig clearly would not
improve traffic safety, which was the objective of the statute. Fur-
ther, no countervailing constitutional right to buy beer was at is-
sue, since a flat ban on the sale of beer to both groups would un-
questionably be constitutional.6 0 Finally, there was not even a
claim that the classification system in Craig was justified by ad-
ministrative convenience.6' Thus, there was no sufficiently good
57 Id. at 199-200.
58 Id. at 201-02 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Court argued that both Reed and Fron-
tiero involved a far higher correlation between sex and the legitimate classifying factor that
sex was meant to approximate. Id. at 202 & n.13.
59 See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
60 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n.24.
61 Moreover, it does not appear that a colorable claim of administrative convenience
could have been made here. The state is not required to single out individuals who are likely
to drink and drive; on the contrary, if it wants to prohibit the sale of beer, it must simply
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reason for not simply extending the ban to cover' women as well as
men. While the Court's opinion does not address the statute in
terms of the gender-neutral test,62 its result can perhaps best be
explained as an application of these principles.
2. Orr. Three years later, in Orr v. Orr,61 the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of an Alabama law that provided that
husbands, but not wives, might be required to pay alimony upon
divorce ." The Court noted that two important objectives might be
served by the Alabama statute: "to provide help for needy spouses,
using sex as a proxy for need";6 5 and to "compensat[e] women for
past discrimination during marriage. 6 6 The Court noted that it
would ordinarily analyze the "needy spouse" objective by asking
whether sex was a sufficiently accurate proxy for dependence.
6 7
Similarly, the "compensation" rationale would ordinarily be ana-
lyzed by asking whether women had been "significantly discrimi-
nated against in the sphere to which the statute applied. . . leav-
ing the sexes 'not similarly situated with respect to opportunities'
in that sphere .... "68
In this case, however, the Court held that "even if sex were a
reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage did
discriminate against women," the statute would still be unconstitu-
tional because Alabama already held individualized hearings at
which the parties' relative financial situations were considered. 9
apply the prohibition to both males and females. See 429 U.S. at 210 n.24. The extra cost
involved in a statute that covered women as well as men would be minimal.
82 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
63 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
1, ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 to -52 (1975) (amended 1979); id. § 30-2-53 (1975) (repealed
1979); see Orr, 440 U.S. at 270 & n.1.
Orr, 440 U.S. at 280.
88 Id. The statute's challengers in the Supreme Court had argued that it served no
other purpose than to enforce "the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibil-
ities." Id. at 279. The Court chose to focus on the two more acceptable interpretations of the
statute provided in the opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. See Orr, 440 U.S. at
280; Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 904, 905 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
87 Orr, 440 U.S. at 280-81 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). The Court stated that it would "ordinarily" inquire whether the
statute's "gender-classification rests '"upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation."'" Orr, 440 U.S. at 280-81 (citations
omitted).
88 Id. at 281 (emphasis in original) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974)). In these earlier cases, the Court had held
that statutory distinctions could be drawn on the basis of gender where they were "efforts
... to remedy th[e] situation" resulting from "overt discrimination [against women] or
from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture . Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353.
8 Orr, 440 U.S. at 281.
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Since individualized hearings could result in a program that would
fulfill the state's goals, and because such hearings already took
place, not even the rationale of administrative convenience could
be advanced to support Alabama's statute.70 The Court concluded
that "[w]here, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative
purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as
one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage
of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on
the basis of sex." 71
The Court's holding was explicitly based on the assumptions
that the government objectives were "important" enough and the
sexes sufficiently different for the statute to pass conventional,
even heightened, equal protection analysis.72 Nevertheless, the
statute was struck down because it failed to meet another require-
ment: the state could not show any reason for not making individ-
ualized determinations (and thus treating the sexes identically) us-
ing the apparatus that was already established to hear such issues.
This requirement-that the state show some good reason for not
treating men and women identically-is the essence of the gender-
neutral test. Indeed, Orr is the clearest example yet of a decision
using that test and showing that it imposes a requirement in addi-
tion to those of the conventional similarly-situated test.
3. Wengler. The next year, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co.,73 the Court struck down a provision of Missouri's
workers' compensation laws that denied a widower death benefits
unless he either was mentally or physically incapacitated or proved
dependence on his wife's earnings; a widow, however, was granted
death benefits without having to make a similar showing.7 4 It was
argued that the statute was intended to help widows and was con-
stitutional because the hardship suffered by widows from the loss
of a spouse is generally greater than that experienced by widow-
ers. 75 The Court conceded that providing for needy spouses is an
important government objective and that the Missouri statute was
70 Id. at 281 & n.12.
71 Id. at 283.
72 That is, an analysis based on the similarly-situated test.
73 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
71 See id. at 143-46.
75 Id. at 150. The Missouri Supreme Court, purportedly applying the test laid out in
Craig v. Boren, had found that the statutory goal of helping widows was an important gov-
ernmental objective. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Mo. 1979) (en
banc); see also Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150. The Missouri rourt also concluded that the dis-
criminatory means employed were substantially related to that objective. 583 S.W.2d at 168.
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aimed at that goal. 7 6 The Court argued, however, that the "dis-
criminatory means employed" 77  did not "itself substantially
serve[]" that end because the needs of widows and widowers would
just as effectively be met if the state granted "benefits to all mem-
bers of both classes or [paid] benefits only to those members of
either class who c[ould] demonstrate their need. '7 s The only justi-
fication for employing a gender-based distinction was the assertion
that it was administratively efficient to presume dependence on
the part of widows while making individualized determinations
only in the few cases where men might be dependent.79 Although
the Court conceded that administrative savings might be signifi-
cant enough to justify a gender-based classification,80 it held that
such a showing was not made out by the "bare assertion" of a sig-
nificant difference in economic standing between widows and wid-
owers.8" Instead, the state must advance a "persuasive demonstra-
tion as to what the economic consequences . . .might be if...
men and women. . . were treated equally under the workers' com-
pensation law. 8 2
While pointing out that the state had merely asserted that in
general the economic circumstances of widows and widowers dif-
fered significantly, the Court gave no indication that proving the
assertion would have saved the classification." Instead, it focused
on whether the state had demonstrated sufficient justification for
not treating men and women identically.8 4 A showing that men and
women are not similarly situated would not, without more, meet
this standard. Thus, the gender-neutral test appears to explain the
Court's decision in Wengler.
7' Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151.
"I Id. The Court found that the Missouri "statute discriminates against both men and
women." Id. at 147. Denying death benefits to widowers, in circumstances where similarly
situated widows would receive them, discriminates against males; denying working women
the absolute entitlement to spousal-protection benefits, where similarly situated working
males receive such an entitlement, discriminates against females. Id.
78 Id. at 151.
7 Id.
80 Id. at 152.
sl Id. at 151-52.
82 Id. at 152.
83 See id. at 151-52. Indeed, given the strong correlation between sex and economic
dependence presented in Frontiero, it is difficult to perceive how the addition of such evi-
dence would have saved the statutory provisions at issue in Wengler. In fact, the Court
appeared to concede that the state's assertion was probably correct as an empirical matter.
See id. at 151.
8, See id. at 151-52.
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C. Recent Decisions
1. Michael M. The legitimacy of the gender-neutral ap-
proach, not expressly addressed in the Court's prior opinions, be-
came an issue in 1981. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,8 5 the
Court upheld a California statutory-rape law that made it unlawful
for a man to have sex with a woman under eighteen years of age
and that imposed criminal liability upon the male participant
only."' The state attempted to justify the statute as an attempt to
prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies.8 Although the Court ac-
cepted this state interest as important ss and upheld the statute, no
majority could agree upon a rationale.8 9
After stating that "the Court has had some difficulty in agree-
ing upon the proper approach and analysis in cases involving chal-
lenges to gender-based classifications," 90 a plurality of four Jus-
tices, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that
gender classifications may not be "'entirely unrelated to any dif-
ferences between men and women,' 91 but that a statute will be
upheld "where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather
realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situ-
ated in certain circumstances. 9 2 The plurality concluded that the
classification at issue was "sufficiently related"9 3 to its objective
since virtually all the harms of teenage pregnancy fall on young
women,9 4 and that a legislature could reasonably have decided to
punish only the party who suffers few of the harmful consequences
85 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
86 Id. at 466. There was an exception if the participants were married. Id.
"I See id. at 470.
99 Justice Rehnquist stated in his plurality opinion that "[w]e are satisfied that the...
State has a strong interest in preventing [illegitimate] pregnancy." Id.; cf. id. at 479 & n.9
(Stewart, J., concurring) (harms are especially acute for the mother); id. at 481-82 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (endorsing plurality's statement that "'teenage pregnancies... have
increased dramatically over the last two decades' and 'have significant social, medical, and
economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State' ") (quoting id. at
470).
89 Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion in which he was joined by three Justices.
Justice Stewart joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, but also filed a separate concurring
opinion in which he expressed views somewhat different from those of the plurality. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment only. Justice Brennan was joined in dissent by Jus-
tices Marshall and White, and Justice Stevens fied his own dissenting opinion.
"o Michael M., 450 U.S. at 468. The plurality referred to the Craig v. Boren test as one
of several formulations of the appropriate test. Id. at 468-69.
11 Id. at 469 (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion)).
9' Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (citations omitted).
93 Id. at 473.
" Id.
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of the proscribed conduct.9 5 Furthermore, the risk of pregnancy al-
ready deters females; a sanction applied only to males would thus
"roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes."96
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that the plurality did not
correctly apply the substantial-relation test.9 7 In his view, the sub-
stantial-relation test required California to "prov[e] that a gender-
neutral statutory rape law would be less effective than [the gender-
specific one at issue] in deterring sexual activity leading to teenage
pregnancy." 8 The plurality expressly rejected this approach,
claiming that Justice Brennan had not accurately stated the "rele-
Id. at 471-73.
Id. at 473. The plurality thus found that there are reasons for applying a burden to
males that do not apply to females: males, who do not suffer the direct consequences of
their action, are not naturally deterred, while females, who experience the harmful effects of
teenage pregnancy, are already deterred. This reasoning is indicative of the similarly-situ-
ated test.
The plurality apparently also found it significant that the statute discriminated against
men rather than against women. Without explaining the significance of this observation, the
plurality stated near the end of its opinion:
In upholding the California statute we also recognize that this is not a case where a
statute is being challenged on the grounds that it "invidiously discriminates" against
females. To the contrary, the statute places a burden on males which is not shared by
females. But we find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or
peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts.
450 U.S. at 475-76. The implication is that a different standard of judicial review is applied
where the government discrimination burdens men than is applied where the burden is on
women. This part of the plurality's opinion, however, should be read in light of previous and
subsequent cases that clearly contradict it. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(applying intermediate-level scrutiny to statute discriminating against men in the sale of
beer) (discussed supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (that a statute "discriminates against males rather than
against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review") (cita-
tions and footnote omitted).
11 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 488-89 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 489 n.2. Justice Brennan also stated more generally that the state must show
"that a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of achieving [the statute's]
goal." Id. at 490 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980)
(discussed supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281, 283
(1979) (discussed supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text)). Justice Brennan seemingly
would require that the "good reason" necessary to meet the gender-neutral test be an ad-
vancement of the statute's objective. He apparently would not accept men's interest in sex-
ual freedom as a justification for the hypothetical statutory rape law discussed earlier. See
supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. But this reasoning could not be carried so far as
to prevent any reason unrelated to the goal of the statute from being "good" enough for
gender-specific treatment. For example, suppose the government required that all males un-
dergo an extremely painful treatment to prevent the spread of a contagious disease that
could afflict only men. While gender-neutral treatment would not be a less effective means
of achieving the statute's goals, it would be absurd to suggest that the pain associated with
the medical treatment did not provide a sufficient reason for exempting women.
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vant inquiry."99 Thus, the crux of the disagreement between Jus-
tice Brennan and the plurality was the legitimacy of the gender-
neutral test.
Although it appeared to reject the gender-neutral inquiry, the
plurality did attempt to answer Justice Brennan's argument."0
The state had contended that the statute's efficacy would be im-
paired if it were gender-neutral since young women would no
longer report the men with whom they had intercourse. 10 1 The plu-
rality accepted this argument, stating that, because "a female is
surely less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself
would be subject to criminal prosecution," 02 "[i]t can be plausibly
argued that a gender-neutral statute would produce fewer prosecu-
tions than the statute at issue here.' 0 3 Justice Brennan responded
that this "bare assertion" by the state was insufficient.10 4 Further-
more, Justice Brennan claimed, the state's argument was flawed in
two ways: first, actual experience disproved the state's assertion, 0 5
and second, "common sense" suggested that subjecting both men
and women to sanctions would result in twice the deterrent effect
of subjecting only men to sanctions. 0 6
Thus, even if the plurality were willing to acknowledge the ex-
istence of the gender-neutral test, it would have disagreed with the
dissent over the application of the test. Taking a deferential atti-
tude reminiscent of rationality review, the plurality appeared sim-
ply to accept the state's assertion at face value, content that it was
a "plausible" reason for not treating men and women identically.
Under this approach, once the government has shown that the
statute satisfies the similarly-situated test, it need only show that
the classification is rationally related to the "good reason" required
by the gender-neutral test. Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
would require the state to "prove" that a gender-neutral law would
be less effective than the gender-specific one.
2. Rostker. The question of the validity of the gender-neutral
test arose again the same year. In Rostker v. Goldberg,107 the
Court, in a five-four decision, upheld male-only draft registration.
'" Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473.
100 Id. at 473-74 & n.10.
101 Id. at 473-74 & nn.9-10.
102 Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
103 Id. at 474 n.10.
"I Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 492-93.
108 Id. at 493-94.
107 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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Emphasizing that draft registration is a military concern and that
Congress receives special deference when it legislates in the mili-
tary area,10 8 the Court examined the legislative history of the selec-
tive-service statute and concluded that the primary purpose of reg-
istration is to prepare for conscripting combat troops. 09 Because
women are ineligible, either by statute or regulation, for combat
duty," 0 Congress concluded that women would not be needed in
the event of a draft."' On this record, the Court upheld the
statute.
Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on
women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a
draft or registration for a draft. . . . [In this case] "the gender
classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects
the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated" . . . . The
Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situated
persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial
equality."2
Justice White and Justice Marshall dissented in separate opin-
ions. " 3 Both relied to some extent on evidence that there would
be, in the event of a draft, 80,000 noncombat positions available
that could be filled by women. 1 4 There was no reason, they ar-
gued, to exclude women from registration if there would be some
room for them in the draft. 1 5 The Court dealt with this argument
108 Id. at 64-68.
109 Id. at 72-76.
n1 Id. at 76-77.
" Id. at 77.
12 Id. at 78-79 (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion)) (emphasis added). Rostker presented a peculiar situation because the gender-
based statute was related to another governmental activity in which sex discrimination was
unchallenged and apparently constitutional. Cf. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Because of the different ways in which the Justices perceived this underlying factor,
the Court split not only on the appropriateness of the gender-neutral test, but also on
whether men and women were indeed similarly situated for purposes of the statutory
classification.
11 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83-86 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 86-113 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan joined both dissents.
14 See id. at 84 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 100-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 85-86 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 94-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If no
women at all would be required for military duty during a war, it would make little sense to
register them. If, however, women could be conscripted to fill some positions during a war, it
would not "further[] the goal of preparing for a draft of combat troops" to exclude women
from registration. See id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view, the
Court's earlier decisions stood for the proposition that gender-based statutes are unconstitu-
tional unless "a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of attaining [the
statute's] end." Id.; see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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in three ways. First, it reasoned that Congress could legitimately
conclude that it was not worth the trouble of registering all women
when so few positions would be available." 6 Second, it noted that
any need for women could easily be met by volunteers.', Finally,
it found that Congress had concluded that "staffing noncombat po-
sitions with women during a mobilization would be positively det-
rimental to the important goal of military flexibility."' 18
The disagreement between the majority and the dissenters can
be seen as a disagreement about the validity of the gender-neutral
test. The dissenters argued that Congress had demonstrated no
good reason for not including women in a registration.119 Although
the majority attempted to argue that there was a good reason for
not including women in a registration,'2 ° it relied primarily on the
significant difference between men and women attributable to the
fact that only men can serve in combat positions. 2" Justice Mar-
shall described the difference between his approach and the major-
ity's as follows:
[A]lthough the Court purports to apply the Craig v. Boren
test, the "similarly situated" analysis the Court employs is in
fact significantly different from the Craig v. Boren approach.
.. . [T]he majority concludes that women may be excluded
from registration because they will not be needed in the event
of a draft.
This analysis, however, focuses on the wrong question.
The relevant inquiry under the Craig v. Boren test is not
whether a gender-neutral classification would substantially
advance important governmental interests. Rather, the ques-
tion is whether the gender-based classification is itself sub-
stantially related to the achievement of the asserted govern-
mental interest. Thus, the Government's task in this case is to
demonstrate that excluding women from registration substan-
tially furthers the goal of preparing for a draft of combat
troops. . . . [T]he Government must show. . . that a gender-
neutral statute would be a less effective means of attaining
this end. 22
16 Id. at 81 (majority opinion).
117 Id.
I' Id. at 81-82.
19 Id. at 83-86 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 92-102 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 72-83 (majority opinion).
121 Id. at 76.
122 Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis in orig-
inal). Marshall claimed that his approach was supported by the Court's decisions in
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Michael M. and Rostker are the first cases in which the Court
focuses on the gender-neutral inquiry as an independent, though
controversial, step in the "substantial relation" analysis. The plu-
rality in Michael M. and the majority in Rostker both claimed to
rely on the similarly-situated test alone, yet both felt constrained
to address questions raised by the gender-neutral test as well.
While the Justices have differed over both the validity of the gen-
der-neutral inquiry and its application, neither side has presented
a theoretical justification for its position.
III. THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION
A. The Evolution of the Gender-Neutral Requirement
Gender discrimination was the first area of equal protection
jurisprudence in which the Court adopted an intermediate level of
judicial scrutiny. Before taking this step, the Court had always op-
erated at the extremes: it applied either rationality review (and
usually upheld the statute),123 or strict scrutiny (and usually struck
it down). 24 Once the Court identified the appropriate standard of
review, the result was fairly predictable. With the adoption of an
intermediate standard of review in the gender cases, the Court
needed to fashion a test that could be used to distinguish valid
from invalid classifications without being safely anchored at a doc-
trinal extreme.
The Court's hesitance and uncertainty in moving to the inter-
mediate standard is evident in its opinions. In Reed, the Court os-
tensibly adhered to minimum rationality, but with "bite.' 1 25 In
Frontiero, four members of the Court invoked strict scrutiny, but
Wengler (discussed supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text), and Orr (discussed supra
notes 63-72 and accompanying text). See id. at 94-95. Justice Marshall continued:
In this case, the Government makes no claim that preparing for a draft of combat
troops cannot be accomplished just as effectively by registering both men and women
but drafting only men if only men turn out to be needed. Nor can the Government
argue that this alternative entails the additional cost and administrative inconvenience
of registering women. This Court has repeatedly stated that the administrative conve-
nience of employing a gender classification is not an adequate constitutional justifica-
tion under the Craig v. Boren test.
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 95 (citations and footnote omitted).
The majority attempted to show how the statute complied with Marshall's test by
pointing out that Congress concluded that a gender-neutral statute would be "positively
detrimental" to the statute's goal. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81-82; supra text accompanying note
118.
123 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
I" See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing Reed).
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without the ferocity normally associated with that level of re-
view. 126 In each opinion, the Court's language appears to comport
with traditional equal protection analysis. Yet in each case, the
Court's analysis of the most common government justifica-
tion-administrative efficiency-is, in hindsight, ambiguous. While
the most natural reading of the Court's position is that administra-
tive efficiency is not a sufficiently important government objective,
the Court's language sometimes suggests that, although a statute
has a legitimate objective (for example, providing for dependent
spouses or promoting competent management of estates), adminis-
trative convenience was an insufficiently good reason for not treat-
ing the sexes identically.127
When the Court abandoned its attempts to employ the old
and familiar approaches and expressly adopted intermediate scru-
tiny in Craig v. Boren,12 the transition was viewed warily by sev-
eral members of the Court. 129 While Craig did clear up some confu-
sion by providing a new verbal formula, the "substantial relation"
requirement was not precise enough to provide real certainty. Fur-
thermore, the decision in Craig is itself confusing with respect to
the proper comparison to be made between men and women under
the similarly-situated inquiry. 30 The gender-neutral test can be
used to explain the decision, but the Court did not expressly em-
ploy that analysis.' 3 ' To the extent that the gender-neutral test
was present in the Court's opinions, it was still hidden behind the
labels of conventional equal protection analysis.
In Orr'3 2 and Wengler,3's the gender-neutral approach came
into sharper focus, though it was still not expressly distinguished
from the traditional approach. 3 4 A comparison of Orr and Wen-
"" See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text (discussing Frontiero).
127 See supra notes 38-39, 49-52 and accompanying text.
'2" See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing Craig).
M See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing
reservations about embracing a third level of scrutiny, but admitting that "candor compels
the recognition that the. . . 'rational basis' standard of review. . . takes on a sharper focus
when we address a gender-based classification"); id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (only
one standard should apply in equal protection cases); id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(statute invalid because it amounts to "total irrationality"); id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (the Court's new standard "comes out of thin air").
130 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussing Orr).
122 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (discussing Wengler).
18 In Wengler, for example, the Court appears to use the gender-neutral test as an
evidentiary requirement to supplement the inherently imprecise similarly-situated inquiry.
See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980) ("bare assertion" of
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gler with the earlier, but similar, case of Frontiero shows how the
Court's analysis had changed. All three cases involved a statutory
burden that was based on the presumption that women typically
are dependent on their husbands while husbands rarely are depen-
dent on their wives. 135 Frontiero's rejection of administrative con-
venience as a sufficient justification for discrimination appears
from the opinion to fall within the conventional requirement that
the government interest be sufficiently important. The gender-neu-
tral requirement, to the extent that it can be found in the opinion
at all, is undeveloped.136 In Orr and Wengler, however, the implicit
application of the gender-neutral inquiry becomes much clearer:
the government's objective is accepted as legitimate and impor-
tant, and administrative convenience is rejected as a sufficiently
good reason for treating the sexes differently. 137 At this point, the
Court had moved from confusing discussions of various relevant
notions to an approach that more clearly incorporated the gender-
neutral test.
The gender-neutral inquiry was finally discussed openly in
Michael M.13 1 and Rostker. e 39 The plurality in Michael M. and the
majority in Rostker appeared reluctant to carry the substantial-
relation test further than required by the traditional similarly-situ-
ated inquiry. Nevertheless, both opinions attempted to analyze the
challenged statutes under the gender-neutral test, and each felt
that it had identified good reasons to explain why the statutes
should not have been drawn on a gender-neutral basis. 140 The dis-
sents in these cases framed the issue in terms of the Court's ac-
difference between men and women not enough; state must make "persuasive demonstra-
tion" of economic consequences of gender-neutral treatment); supra notes 81-82 and accom-
panying text.
133 In both Frontiero and Wengler, a woman automatically qualified for the statutory
benefits because of her presumed dependence, while a man had to prove his dependence in
order to qualify. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678; Wengler, 446 U.S. at 143-46. In Orr, the
presumption that the wife is usually the dependent spouse was used in an attempt to justify
giving women the right to receive alimony while denying men this right altogether. See Orr,
440 U.S. at 270, 280.
138 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
137 In fact, when Justices Brennan and Marshall later openly defended the gender-neu-
tral inquiry, each cited both Orr and Wengler for support. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 94 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 490
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text (discussing Michael M.).
138 See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text (discussing Rostker).
"10 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81-82 (decreased military flexibility); supra note 118 and
accompanying text; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473-74 & n.10 (plurality opinion) (decreased
enforcement of the statutory rape law); supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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ceptance or rejection of the gender-neutral approach, but the re-
sults seemed to depend not so much on the validity of the test as
on its application. 41
The reluctance of the Rostker Court to apply the gender-neu-
tral test may be explained by the Court's highly deferential atti-
tude toward congressional decisions in the military area.'42 Never-
theless, the refusal of a majority of the Court to apply the test, at
least with the same force with which it had been applied implicitly
in Orr and Wengler, indicates that the Court's perception of the
test has changed. Michael M. and Rostker have brought the issue
out into the open, but the Court has yet to decide definitively
whether and to what degree the gender-neutral test is legitimate.
B. Implications and Legitimacy of the Gender-Neutral
Requirement
Although the equal protection clause flatly guarantees "equal
protection of the laws, ' '143 it would be ludicrous to interpret the
clause as requiring that each person must be treated the same as
every other person. Consequently, legislatures are given wide dis-
cretion to classify, 44 and the dominant view of the equal protec-
tion clause holds that the clause prohibits only those classifications
that result from illegitimate purposes. 45 An illegitimate purpose
might be rooted in hostility toward certain groups, 146 but it need
not be. In the case of gender, for example, the major concern is
that legislators will act on the basis of stereotyped notions about
the sexes.' 47
141 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra note 122 and accompa-
nying text; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 489 & n.2, 492-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra notes
97-98, 104-06 and accompanying text.
14 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65 ("The case arises in the context of Congress' author-
ity over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court
accorded Congress greater deference."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20
(1944) (upholding, under strict scrutiny, wartime classification based on national origin).
,43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (disparate impact alone is
not enough: racially discriminatory purpose must be shown); see also Sunstein, Public Val-
ues, supra note 19, at 130-31.
146 For example, the clause is violated by classifications based on a bare desire to harm
a certain group. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973); Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 19, at 1689-1704, 1710-17, 1727-32.
147 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-26 & nn.10-11
(1982) (purpose of "substantial relation" requirement "is to assure that the validity of a
classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
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Since legislators rarely express their illicit purposes openly,
their motives must usually be inferred. One way to infer motive is
to look at the "fit" between the legislation's purported objective
and the classification employed in the statute. The better the fit,
the more likely it is that the legislature adopted the classification
in furtherance of the legitimate objective rather than for a prohib-
ited purpose.148 How "tight" a fit is required depends on how likely
it is that improper motives are behind the statute. 49 Because the
similarly-situated test measures the fit between a classification and
its asserted end, it provides one means of uncovering illicit
motive.150
The gender-neutral inquiry can fulfill the same role. If the
government cannot point to a sufficiently important goal that is
promoted by a gender-specific classification and that would not
also be served by a gender-neutral classification, then the actual
motive behind the statute may be the achievement of a goal other
than, or in addition to, the legitimate one. Otherwise, there would
be no need to draw a gender line at all. If the gender distinction
does further a legitimate purpose, then there is reason to believe
that the classification was based on reasoned legislative judgment,
rather than on illegitimate stereotypes. Viewed in this light, the
gender-neutral test differs from the similarly-situated test only in
that the former is "stricter" than the latter-that is, fewer statutes
will pass the gender-neutral test than will pass the similarly-situ-
ated test.
When viewed as a screen for improper motive, the most obvi-
ous problem with the gender-neutral test arises from the "error
costs" that are associated with it. The judiciary generally owes
great deference to the legislature's judgment and expertise.' 5'
Courts should not question facially valid legislative decisions ex-
women") (footnote omitted); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (gender classifications
"carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and
their need for special protection") (citation omitted); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (describing history of paternalism which "put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage"). Such stereotypes are considered especially unfair in light of
the virtual immutability of gender. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Sex-based classifications are in many settings invidious because
they relegate a person to the place set aside for the group on the basis of an attribute that
the person cannot change.") (citations omitted).
:1 See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 145-48.
4' See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
,50 See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (deference due a coequal
branch of government); supra note 11 and accompanying text (presumption of
constitutionality).
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cept when there is reason to suspect that an illicit motive lies be-
hind the decision; furthermore, the degree of scrutiny should vary
according to the strength of this suspicion. 152 For example, strict
scrutiny is the most powerful test of motive because it will result
in a statute being held invalid if there is even the slightest chance
that it is the product of illicit motive; but strict scrutiny would be
wholly out of place in cases where there is no reason to suspect the
legislature's motive.153 That is, "more" scrutiny is not always bet-
ter; it may merely be more inaccurate. The legitimacy of the gen-
der-neutral test, then, depends on showing that it is not too "pow-
erful" in relation to the suspicion appropriately attaching to
gender classifications.
Nevertheless, requiring the government to demonstrate a good
reason for not providing gender-neutral treatment may be justified
by reasons that outweigh the danger of invalidating some statutes
that are not rooted in illicit motives. The essence of the gender-
neutral inquiry is a presumption that the sexes should be treated
identically: if the government wants to deviate from this ideal, it
must provide a persuasive reason for doing so. Thus, the test may
rest on a conception of sexual equality as an affirmative value in
itself. If so, the gender-neutral test may require that differential
treatment be held invalid, even where the fit between means and
ends allays the suspicion of illegitimate motive, if the value served
by disparate treatment does not outweigh the value attached to
equality.15 4 If this view of the gender-neutral test were accepted, it
would represent a major development in the law because it appears
inconsistent with established equal protection doctrine, which re-
quires evidence of an illicit motive, even where racial discrimina-
tion is alleged. 55
151 See, e.g., supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text; cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (presumption of validity removed where classification is based on
race).
"' Likewise, something akin to the gender-neutral test could in theory be applied to
economic legislation, but only a weak version of the test would be appropriate given the
deference that the Court accords a legislature operating in this area. See, e.g., United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (validity of the regulation of commer-
cial activities presumed; more exacting scrutiny reserved for, inter alia, discrimination
against "discrete and insular minorities"); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; cf.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 19, at 1715-16 (discussing argument for expanding
the coverage of heightened review).
"' For a critique of the position that treats equality as an affirmative value, see Wes-
ten, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 568 (1982) (arguing that the "pre-
sumption for equality" is inconsistent with the notion that "likes should be treated alike").
'" See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); supra note 145 and accom-
panying text. The racial-discrimination cases establishing the motive requirement, however,
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CONCLUSION
In gender discrimination cases decided under the equal pro-
tection clause, the Court usually asks whether there is a reason to
burden one sex that does not apply to the other, but often also
asks whether there is a "good" reason, beyond the relevant differ-
ences between the sexes, for not treating the two identically. The
Court has yet to indicate clearly whether it deems the latter ap-
proach appropriate, although its most recent opinions seem to sug-
gest that it does not accept the additional inquiry as a strong, sep-
arate requirement applicable to all cases of gender discrimination.
Rejection of the test might be appropriate for two reasons. First,
the test may incorporate an incorrect assumption about the likeli-
hood of illicit legislative motive in gender-classification cases. Sec-
ond, the gender-neutral inquiry may embody a theory of equality
that, according to prevailing doctrine, is not reflected in the equal
protection clause. In any event, the Court must address the emer-
gence of the gender-neutral test in order to provide coherence and
certainty to the area of intermediate-level scrutiny.
William R. Engles
involved facially neutral statutes that had a disparate impact along racial lines. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976). The gender-neutral test, on the other hand,
would be applied only to statutes that clearly draw a gender distinction. Depending on the
appropriate level of scrutiny, it may be reasonable to say that a facial gender distinction
that does not itself further some important interest provides sufficient evidence of illicit
motive, even where there is a substantial difference between men and women that is related
to the object of the statute. If one takes this view, one could argue that the test will strike
down statutes only where the legislature's motive is impugned.
The gender-neutral inquiry might also be valid to the extent that women are seen as a
group requiring special judicial protection. Professor John Hart Ely has argued that the
Constitution provides protection to those groups that cannot effectively seek redress
through normal democratic processes. See J. ELY, supra note 15, at 135-79. Although the
claim that women are politically powerless would be difficult to substantiate, cf. id. at 164-
70 (discussing the appropriate level of "suspectness" in gender cases), the Court has decided
that women are a semi-suspect class and are entitled to special judicial solicitude.
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